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1. Rationale and objectives  
 
In the history of semantics and pragmatics, the label ‘conditional’ has been used for a variety 
of constructions and phenomena and has been delimited in a number of ways. In this paper 
we focus on what we call a ‘pragmatic category of conditionals’. We propose to tie the notion 
of ‘conditionality’ to the property of expressed thoughts and at the same time explain 
conditionality so understood using a version of post-Gricean truth-conditional contextualist 
semantics. So, our primary interest is how speakers express conditional meanings in 
discourse and how the diversity of forms that can be used to express such conditional 
meanings can be accounted for in a theory of discourse meaning. One of the strengths of our 
approach lies in its methodology. We start with extensive empirical data and use the rather 
uncontroversial assumptions that (i) we will find examples of conditional sentences – 
sentences of the form ‘if p, q’ – that express conditional or non-conditional thoughts, and 
equally that (ii) there will be conditional thoughts that are expressed by other, non-
conditional sentence forms. In other words, our pragmatic category of conditionality will not 
be constrained by the sentence form, and yet our analysis will yield itself to a truth-
conditional treatment, and as such, to a contextualist semantic representation. While it has 
been observed in the literature that there are conditionals which are expressed through non-
conditional sentence forms, to our knowledge there has been no fully developed 
semantic/pragmatic unified account of conditionality that would incorporate them. As will be 
evident throughout the paper, our approach will be founded on accepting the assumption of a 
relaxed approach to compositionality called ‘interactive compositionality’; that is, 
compositionality predicated of acts of communication rather than sentence structures – the 
topic to which we turn in Section 4. The advantage of our analysis lies in offering a treatment 
of this pragmatically construed category in a formal framework that enjoys predictive power 
and normativity.  
 The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we attend to the distinction 
between conditional sentences, utterances and thoughts, and motivate our pragmatic stance. 
In Section 3, we attend to the mismatches between forms and meanings in expressing 
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conditionality in more detail, and to their theoretical consequences. In Section 4, we justify 
adopting Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2005, 2010, 2016), a radical contextualist approach to 
representing meaning, demonstrating how representation of conditionality across a broad 
spectrum of structures can be achieved in this framework. Section 5 concludes and indicates 
remaining questions and possible further directions.  
 
2. Conditional sentences, conditional utterances, and conditional thoughts 
 
The meanings of conditionals have given rise to many discussions and controversies in 
formal semantics, cognitive semantics and post-Gricean pragmatics. In formal semantics, 
pragmatic considerations have often been appealed to in order to demonstrate that conditional 
sentences in natural language do, or do not, essentially stem out of material conditionals on 
the level of their logical form. On the other hand, various classifications of conditional 
sentences have emphasised a battery of criteria by means of which, allegedly, one ought to 
distinguish qualitatively different categories of what superficially appears to be merely an 
instance of ‘if p, q’. Our objective in this paper is a little different from just adding a voice to 
these disputes, and is, we think, more positive in its outlook. We attempt to offer an argument 
for a unified pragmatic category of conditionals that is not based on the syntactic form of the 
expression, the presence of a relevant connective, or even a conditional meaning as it is 
understood in minimalist semantic accounts. In other words, the object of study is not how 
uttered sentences map onto their underlying logical forms, but rather the main intended 
meanings that speakers use these utterances to convey. For that purpose, we show that by 
adopting Default Semantics, a radical contextualist approach to natural language meaning, 
one can bring together various uses of conditional sentences on the one hand, and various 
(overt and covert) means of expressing conditional thought in natural language on the other.  
 To repeat, the resultant object of study is what we term a ‘pragmatic category of 
conditionals’; we appeal to pragmatic processes to recover (i) conditional meanings that may 
be expressed either overtly or covertly, and (ii) utterances whose conditionality constitutes 
either the primary intended meaning of the speaker as it is understood in Default Semantics, 
or some secondary meaning – that is the meaning that does not pertain to the main intended 
speech act. In other words, we are left with a cognitively plausible pragmatic category which 
at the same time yields itself to a truth-conditional treatment. 
 It is an interesting albeit unsurprising fact about the English language that there is no 
bi-unique relation between the form of a conditional sentence and conditional meaning. 
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‘Unsurprising’ in that the lack of such bi-uniqueness is also pervasive in other domains, such 
as those of other sentential vis-à-vis logical connectives, temporal reference (where we find 
tense-time mismatches), or of illocutionary forces and their realisations by illocutionary 
verbs. With reference to conditionals, on the one hand, (i) conditional sentences are not the 
only way to express conditional thoughts, as (1) and (2) demonstrate, and on the other, (ii) 
conditional sentences can be put to a variety of uses other than expressing conditional 
thoughts, as shown in (3) and (4).1,2 Approximations at the main intended meaning are given 
in (1a)-(4a) respectively. 
 
(1) Touch her iPad and she’ll scream. 
(1a) If you touch her iPad, she’ll scream. 
(2) Your money or your life. 
(2a) If you don’t give me your money, I will take your life. 
(3) If you wouldn’t mind, could you close the door? 
(3a) Please close the door. 
(4) If that’s a real diamond I’ll eat my hat! 
(4a) That is definitely not a real diamond. 
 
This discrepancy in the primary intended meanings of conditional sentences provides the first 
warning sign for delimiting an object of study for a pragmatic, and on our contextualist 
account also semantic, analysis. Perhaps, to make use of Kratzer’s (1991/2012: 106) famous 
dictum, “[t]he history of the conditional is the story of a syntactic mistake”3, but, what is of 
greater interest to us is that it is also a story of a semantic and a pragmatic mistake, in that the 
assumption that conditional sentences should drive semantic investigation has largely 
persisted to this day.4 Some breakthrough can be noticed in Horn’s (2000: 292) critical 
discussion of Geis and Zwicky’s (1971) proposal of conditional perfection (CP) in which he 
                                                          
1 It has to be pointed out that the conditional meaning associated with the conjunction in (1) intuitively appears 
stronger than that associated with the disjunction in (2). However, this does not affect our argument. We thank 
Louis de Saussure for drawing our attention to this point. 
2 This is not to say that in (3) and (4) conditionality is absent altogether on the conceptual level. We return to 
this point in Sections 3.2 and 4. 
3 It has to be remembered that our object of study as well as the research questions are tangential to the concerns 
of a formal semantic account of a particular sentence structure. 
4 As is evident from this discussion, we dissociate ourselves from minimalist, sentence-based accounts of 
semantics (e.g. Borg 2004, 2012; Cappelen & Lepore 2005), and adopt an assumption that semantic theory be 
strongly permeated with context-dependent intention-driven meanings (as it is in Default Semantics adopted 
below). 
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points out that neither is the strengthening to ‘if and only if’ limited to conditional structures, 
nor is the presence of a conditional structure sufficient for its occurrence. Moreover, rather 
than a brand new species, CP appears to be simply a case of Gricean strengthening, easily 
explicable through any of the post-Gricean principles such as Horn’s (e.g. 1984, 1988, 2004) 
R- and Q- principles governing scalar implicatures. So, the exclusivity of ‘if p, q’ as far as 
this type of pragmatic enrichment is concerned, and its status as an object of analysis in its 
own right, appear to merit challenging. 
It appears that the implications of the ‘syntactic mistake’ go much further than were 
originally observed. It seems to us that the most methodologically prudent way to delimit 
conditionality in a theory of meaning is to break away from the ‘if p, q’ requirement 
altogether. As we demonstrate, there are various uses of conditional sentences that have little 
claim to the conditionality of the corresponding thought and, on the other hand, there are 
various natural language expressions that strongly convey conditional thoughts as their 
primary intended meanings, despite being far removed from the syntactic form of a two-
clause ‘if p, q’ sentence. If one adopts the requirement of cognitive plausibility, it is evident 
that the object of study of what counts as a conditional has to be extended. The explanatory 
advantages to this move are that we are able to (i) capture the variety of expression types that 
give rise to conditional thoughts as primary meanings, (ii) systematise the diversity of uses to 
which ‘if p, q’ sentences can be put, as well as (iii) provide a uniform representation of 
conditional meaning that extends to these non-‘if p, q’ sentences on the one hand, and 
differentiates between the conditional meanings expressed by ‘if p, q’ sentences as either 
primary or secondary meanings on the other. 
Before we move on with the task, a terminological explanation is in order. What we 
will be calling the ‘primary meaning’, that is, the primary speech act performed by the 
utterance of the sentence (or, on some occasions, a sentence fragment), may correspond to the 
explicit or implicit content. On the standard analysis of conditional sentences, if the 
conditional meaning pertains to the non-‘if p, q’ sentence such as (1) or (2) above, it will be 
classified as implicit, i.e. as a strong implicature. Instead, in agreement with the distinctions 
drawn in Default Semantics that are discussed in Section 4, we propose to use the term 
‘primary meaning’ that cuts across the explicit/implicit divide and corresponds to the main, 
intended content, where secondary intended meanings are also independent of the 
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explicit/implicit boundary.5 As a result, on this understanding of the term ‘primary’ that 
captures the main intended speech-act content, non-conditional sentence structures can be 
used to express conditional primary meanings. 
 A cross-linguistic perspective adds further support to the decision to delimit the 
category of conditionals using pragmatic principles. Guugu Yimithirr, an Australian 
Aboriginal language spoken in Queensland, has no overt conditionals. Instead, it uses irrealis 
markers resulting in a pair of modal statements with the antecedent-consequent relationship 
between eventualities as in (5) (from Evans & Levinson 2009: 443).  
 
(5) The dog might bark. The postman might run away. 
 
Mauri and van der Auwera (2012) also give examples from a Sino-Tibetan language 
Caodeng, spoken in China, in which the irrealis marker occurs only in the antecedent, and 
Hua, a language spoken in Papua New Guinea, in which the antecedent is formulated as a 
polar question as in (6) (from Mauri and van der Auwera 2012: 398). 
 
(6) Will he come? I will stay. 
 
This variety of means that languages have to express the antecedent-consequent relation 
provides a strong argument for extending the semantic analysis of conditionals beyond 
specific sentence structures. To quote von Fintel & Matthewson (2008: 170), 
 
…while perhaps none of the logical connectives are universally lexically expressed, 
there is no evidence that languages differ in whether or not logical connectives are 
present in their logical forms. 
 
As we demonstrate in Section 4, this diversity constitutes no threat to our object of analysis in 
that our semantics includes aspects of meaning that are pragmatically triggered, and these 
aspects of meaning can even extend beyond the modulation of the logical form. To repeat, a 
uniform analysis is possible when semantics is construed along radical contextualist 
principles, where ‘radical’ is understood as in Default Semantics, allowing for information 
                                                          
5 For arguments and linguistic evidence in favour of the primary/secondary distinction that cuts across the 
explicit/implicit divide see especially Jaszczolt (2009). 
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from different linguistic and non-linguistic sources in communication to contribute to the 
truth-conditional representation.6  
 Radical contextualism has been defined in a variety of (often related) ways. For the 
purpose of this paper we mean by it a view according to which (i) context plays an essential 
role in determining the truth-conditional content of an utterance (cf. Recanati 2004, 2010) but 
moreover a view in which (ii) context has an additional role of helping to identify the main 
speech act intended by the speaker, irrespective of the logical form of the uttered sentence 
(Jaszczolt 2005, 2010). In itself it is not so surprising that we can include such a diverse use 
of conditionals in our account, insofar that such a contextualist account will, by definition, 
make substantial use of information that is not encoded in the structure or the lexicon. The 
significant advantage of our outlook on the category of conditionals becomes apparent when 
it is supported with the possibility of a uniform representation. This allows us to include 
utterances for which conditional thought is not the primary communicated content, such as 
Austin’s (1961) famous ‘biscuit conditional’ (7)7 and metalinguistic comments such as ‘if 
you like’ exemplified in (8). 
 
(7) If you’re thirsty, there’s some beer in the fridge. 
(8) I went in with a bone of complaint, if you like. ICE-GB S1A-064 1428 
 
Our account thus offers a complete picture of how conditionality can arise in the mind, going 
beyond those accounts that acknowledge that conditional thoughts can be expressed without 
using the canonical ‘if p, q’ sentence form, but that ignore the uses of ‘if p, q’ in which the 
conditional thought is not intended as primary.9 
                                                          
6 It is a matter of terminological decision as to whether to call this approach truth-conditional pragmatics and 
leave semantics as a more narrow enterprise, relying on the structure of the sentence and on indexicals (see 
Recanati 2010, 2012) or to give it a label of a truth-conditional, albeit radically contextualist, semantics. In 
agreement with Default Semantics (Jaszczolt, e.g. 2005, 2010, 2016), we opt for the latter alternative.  
7 Austin’s (1961) original example was “If you’re hungry there are some biscuits on the sideboard”, hence the 
term ‘biscuit conditional’. As Horn (2000: 317 fn) notes, the example has morphed, resulting in (7) as the locus 
classicus. 
8 We take many of our examples from the British component of the International Corpus of English (ICE-GB). 
These are referenced using the standard notation from the spoken portion of that corpus, namely of the form 
(S00-000 #000). 
9 Rescher (2007), for example, develops an account of conditionals that would allow non-‘if’-conditionals into 
the analysis, but constrains his attention to what he terms “assertorically consequential conditionals” (Rescher 
2007: 3); in Section 3.2 we argue that ‘if’-conditionals which express non-conditional thoughts can nevertheless 
express conditionality as a secondary meaning, and thus should be included in the analysis. We thank an 
anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this reference. 
7 
 
 Now, any pragmatic analysis of conditional sentences has to establish the 
communicative reason for asserting a conditional thought. The intuition that natural language 
conditionals exhibit some connection between p and q is what Grice (1967/1989: 58) aptly 
captures as the Indirectness Condition that “p would, in the circumstances, be a good reason 
for q”.10 The ‘if p, q’ sentence typically indicates a “passage of thought” (p. 77) from the 
antecedent to the consequent and 
 
in standard cases to say ‘if p then q’ is to be conventionally committed to (to assert or 
imply in virtue of the meaning of ‘if’) both the proposition that p → q and the 
Indirectness Condition. 
 
(Grice 1967/1989: 58). In other words, the Indirectness Condition functions as a generalised 
conversational implicature and as such as a fairly strong, predictable, but at the same time 
cancellable, aspect of meaning. Grice (1967/1989: 62) offered (9) as an example in which the 
Indirectness Condition is allegedly not present.11 
 
(9) If he was surprised, he didn’t show it. 
 
In a similar vein relaxing the relation between p and q, Stalnaker (1975/1999) adopts the 
notion of ‘reasonable inference’ – a pragmatic relation between speech acts that is different 
from semantic entailment, where ‘reasonable’ means that if the premises can be accepted in a 
given context, then so must the conclusions. Acceptance relies on the common ground: the 
assumptions that are made available to both speaker and hearer in the discourse. Then, 
 
a conditional statement, if A, then B, is an assertion that the consequent is true, not 
necessarily in the world as it is, but in the world as it would be if the antecedent were 
true 
 
                                                          
10 Grice maintained that the semantics of conditionals was informed by the material conditional. It has long been 
acknowledged that natural language conditionals do not behave as material conditionals, and in particular, that 
people do not use the logic of material conditionals in their everyday reasoning strategies (see e.g. Johnson-
Laird and Taggart (1969) and Evans & Over (2004)). We thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing our 
attention to these references.  
11 Intuitions concerning the presuppositions in this example vary. In addition, it is possible that the presence of 
negation in the consequent is responsible for (9)’s failure to adhere to the Indirectness Condition. We thank 
Louis de Saussure and an anonymous reviewer for discussing this case with us. 
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(Stalnaker 1975/1999: 68).  
 These two seminal treatments of natural language conditionals have a strong 
pragmatic flavour. While Grice adopts material implication, enriching it with the generalised 
implicature, Stalnaker makes use of pragmatic presuppositions (‘common ground’) and 
pragmatic relations between speech acts (‘reasonable inference’) to move the semantics of 
conditionals away from material implication. It is not our aim to review the vast literature on 
conditionals in natural language. But it seems important to point out that the relevant 
pragmatics- and cognition-oriented approaches seem to fall in four very broad categories, 
where the object of study is constant and is confined, rather traditionally from our proposed 
perspective, to what we term ‘ordinary conditional sentences’. The categories can be 
represented and exemplified as in Table 1.12  
 
  
                                                          
12 We are not extending the present analysis to the discussions of indicative versus counterfactual conditionals 
presented by Lewis (e.g. 1973) or Edgington (e.g. 2008) among others, or to Lycan’s (2001) syntactic approach 
to the ‘if…then’ operator. To repeat, neither do we include, apart from cursory references, Kratzer’s 
(1991/2012) proposal according to which the object of analysis would have to be extended to adverbial clauses. 
These are tangential to our current objective. 
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Object of analysis Theoretical tools Some representatives 
‘ordinary conditional 
sentences’ 
material conditional, (scalar) 
implicature 
Grice (1967) 
possible worlds, pragmatic 
presuppositions 
Stalnaker (1975) 
mental models, reasoning 
strategies 
Byrne & Johnson-Laird 
(2010) 
hypothetical thought, 
sequences of inferences 
Over et al. (2010), Evans & 
Over (2004) 13 
 
Table 1. Conditionals: Objects of analysis and adopted theoretical tools 
                                                          
13 But Over et al. (2010) and Evans and Over (2004) also appeal to Stalnakerian-style semantics for 
counterfactuals, as is discussed below. We thank an anonymous reviewer for reminding us of this. 
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The first approach pertains to the Gricean account on which the explanatory power of 
material implication from propositional logic is recognised in the truth-conditional account 
but is supplemented with the account of a generalised conversational implicature. The 
second, Stalnakerian account is not very remote in spirit but draws on the concept of 
pragmatic presuppositions to yield more intuitive truth conditions, and on the utility of 
possible worlds as a semantic tool. The third proposal comes from a very different tradition 
and is included here because it will prove useful in our broadening of the category of 
conditionals. In discussing conditionals, Byrne and Johnson-Laird (2010: 55) use the tool of 
mental models and exploit the idea that “human thinking rests on the ability to imagine 
possibilities”. As they argue, the meanings of conditionals cannot be explained in terms of 
truth conditions but instead require an analysis in terms of the various strategies that 
interlocutors have at their disposal for processing conditional sentences. The fourth row of 
Table 1 also comes from the cognitive science tradition. However, dissociating themselves 
from mental models, Over et al. (2010) and Evans and Over (2004) focus on the psychology 
of processing of conditionals, and in particular on the principles of building inferential chains 
pertaining to hypothetical thought. These inferences can be of different provenance: they can 
be deductive, probabilistic or non-monotonic (‘pragmatic’). In this manner the authors revive 
Ramsey’s (1929) proposal, exploited in Stalnaker’s account, to the effect that in processing a 
natural language sentence of the form ‘if p, q’, people rely on their own probability 
judgements concerning q, assuming p as given. In other words, they form a hypothesis that p 
is true and then add q to the set of their beliefs, with a qualifier that this belief is founded on 
such a hypothetical foundation. 
 In view of the facts discussed earlier in this section, namely that (i) conditional 
sentences express a variety of different conditional links; (ii) the conditional meaning is not 
necessarily the primary one; and that (iii) a conditional sentence form is not necessary to 
express a conditional thought, we propose to extend the scope of analysis in two directions: to 
‘non-ordinary conditional sentences’ such as biscuit conditionals and the formulaic 
expression ‘if you like’, and to conditional thoughts expressed in a non-conditional form. 
Concerning the theoretical tools, the way we see it is this. Since our overall objective is to 
provide a formal (or at least formalisable) representation of discourse meaning, we will utilise 
truth conditions but apply them to a unit understood in a radical contextualist way: a unit that 
constitutes the main intended meaning of a given utterance, or the main intended speech act – 
following the practice adopted in Default Semantics (Jaszczolt, e.g. 2005, 1010). This unit is 
formed through an interaction of the logical form of the uttered sentence with aspects of the 
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given context – a process we call ‘interactive compositionality’.14 In short, the fifth (and 
adopted here) row of Table 1, represented by the current authors, will look as in Table 2. 
  
                                                          
14 We attend to this theoretical discussion in Section 4. 
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Object of analysis  Theoretical tools 
‘ordinary conditional 
sentences’, ‘non-standard 
conditional sentences’, 
conditional thoughts 
truth conditions, speaker intentions, interactive 
compositionality 
 
Table 2: Object of analysis and theoretical tools on our proposed account 
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This combination of tools will allow us to propose a pragmatics-based delimitation of the 
category of conditionals, paired with an analysis in terms of truth-conditional contextualist 
semantics.15 
 
3. Evidence for a pragmatic category of conditionals 
 
3.1  Criteria for pragmatic conditionality 
In view of our broadly conceived object of study, we need to provide some rationale for 
inclusion in the class to stop the category from over-generating. As we are not limited by 
grammatical forms or specific lexical items, the class of conditionals will be delineated by 
pragmatic criteria. But before we proceed, a terminological remark is in order. As is 
standardly the case, for a conditional sentence of the form ‘if p, q’, p and q – the ‘antecedent’ 
and ‘consequent’ of the conditional, respectively – are syntactically realised and correspond 
to the ‘if’-clause and the main clause of the sentence. Now, when we discuss conditional 
thoughts expressed in discourse via either a conditional or non-conditional sentence, we also 
use the terms ‘antecedent’ and ‘consequent’ in that the antecedent and the consequent as we 
understand them will also be realised on the level of thoughts. As we are concerned with 
conditional thoughts that are expressed in natural language, we maintain the ‘two-clause’ 
view of conditionality; this is opposed to Kratzer’s (1991/2012) syntactic one-clause proposal 
that ‘if’-clauses restrict the domain of modal operators.16 
 Following (Elder 2012, 2014), we take the view that the antecedent has to fulfil two 
criteria in order to count as contributing to a conditional thought. First, the antecedent takes 
the responsibility of forming a supposition. This supposition is translated as a requirement 
that the consequent be restricted to those situations that are invoked by the antecedent. This is 
to be understood as a restriction on context, such as for example that achieved by Stalnaker’s 
(1975, 1998, 2014) ‘context set’ which corresponds to selecting relevant possible worlds. The 
criterion of supposition may be realised in terms of truth and falsity, as in Stalnaker’s 
possible-worlds account. Where we diverge from Stalnaker is that we also allow this criterion 
to extend beyond conditional assertion, to encompass the notion of felicity with respect to the 
consequent. This allows us to include also non-standard conditional structures (such as 
                                                          
15 We note that Sztencel (2013) also maintains that the object of analysis for conditionality has to be located at 
the level of thoughts, but we depart from her assumption that conditionality is linked to the material conditional. 
We thank an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this reference.  
16 We are grateful to the anonymous referee for making us clarify this point.  
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‘biscuit conditionals’) that may convey some conditional thought but at best as secondary, 
additional meanings.  
The criterion that there ought to be a supposition (expressed in some form or other) is 
not sufficient alone, in that it would make the category of conditionals over-generate. We 
want to prevent factual antecedents – ‘factual’ as far as the speaker is concerned – from 
entering the class of conditionals, for example those using ‘since’ or factual ‘when’. Such a 
move can be traced back to Grice’s (1967) acceptability criterion which states that if a 
speaker deems the antecedent to be true, he/she should either have used ‘since’ instead of ‘if’, 
or asserted the consequent outright.17 The second criterion for inclusion in the class of 
conditionals thus appeals to the idea of remoteness, requiring that the antecedent be in some 
sense remote from the actual world. It should be noted that remoteness is not equivalent to a 
belief in the falsehood of the antecedent, but can be realised in a variety of ways. For 
example, we acknowledge that there are cases where the antecedent of a standard ‘if’-
conditional may appear to be true, either by echoing another utterance in the discourse, or 
because it is assumed to be true for the purpose of the discussion. In (10), when the speaker 
tries to convince the addressee that his being in Paris necessarily means that he is in France, 
the truth of the antecedent is presupposed.  
 
(10) If (as you say) you are in Paris, then you are in France.18  
 
The speaker is presenting the antecedent as true, while at the same time communicating 
remoteness by presenting it as a hypothetical situation in order to abstract from the speaker’s 
own assessment of the actual state of affairs.19 This is similarly the case in so-called 
‘counterfactuals with true antecedents’, such as Anderson’s (1951: 37) seminal example 
(11).20 
 
(11) If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown just exactly those symptoms which 
he does in fact show.  
                                                          
17 The requirement can equally be explained in terms of Horn’s (e.g. 1984) scalar implicature. 
18 Example paraphrased from John Maier (p.c.). We thank John Maier and Joseph Tyler for discussing these 
cases with us. 
19 ‘Remoteness’ can either be understood in terms of possible worlds (e.g. Lewis 1979, 1973) or in terms of 
circumstances of evaluation (Predelli 2005). See also de Saussure (2013) on discursive, pragmatically 
determined presuppositions. 
20 Stalnaker (2012) defends the analogous case for counterfactuals. 
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This criterion of remoteness from reality thus requires us to consider the speaker’s epistemic 
stance towards the truth of the antecedent in order to judge whether a given utterance counts 
as conditional. This moves us away from a grammatical definition of conditionals to a 
pragmatic definition, taking aspects of the context of utterance, including the speaker’s 
epistemic state, into consideration.  
Any utterance that fulfils these two criteria will enter the pragmatic category of 
conditionals. Defining conditionals by these pragmatic criteria allows us to appeal to the 
properties of corresponding thoughts; conditional sentences whose primary meaning is not 
conditional, as well as conditional thoughts expressed by non-conditional sentences, can now 
be included in the category.  
 It should be borne in mind that combining any data-based corpus study with these 
pragmatic criteria for conditionality will necessitate carefully tailor-made methodology in 
that they will inevitably lead to problems when utilising automated search facilities. 
Searching for lexical items or even grammatical forms will not be sufficient to generate a full 
list of conditional expressions (although Declerck & Reed 2001 have attempted this). This is 
so for two reasons, namely that (i) when we go beyond structures to thoughts, there is 
possibly an endless number of ways of expressing conditionals, and (ii) any morphosyntactic 
properties of a particular expression in the language system which may be used to express a 
conditional, may also be used to other ends. So, our database of examples is composed of the 
results of automatic searching as well as a manual search for conditional meanings in 
randomly selected conversations in the corpus21, adhering to the criteria for conditionality. 
 With these caveats in mind, the following sections turn to the question of how these 
two criteria can be used to recognise cases of conditional thoughts. Section 3.2 details some 
of the ways in which utterances instantiating the ‘if p, q’ structure adhere to the criteria for 
conditionality, and Section 3.3 provides a sample of the ways in which conditional thoughts 
may be expressed in English when they do not use the standard ‘if p, q’ sentence form. 
Including all these categories in the study allows for an attempt at a classification of the 
pragmatic category of conditionals in Section 4. 
 
3.2.  Conditional sentences with conditional (primary or secondary) meaning 
 
                                                          
21 ICE-GB, see fn 8. See Elder (2012, 2014) for a description of this manual corpus search.  
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It goes without saying that conditional thoughts expressed by ordinary conditional sentence 
forms (‘if p, q’) will fulfil the two criteria for conditionality. These are the standard cases, 
usually expressing causal or inferential relations between p and q. What is not immediately 
obvious is whether, and if so, how conditional sentences used to express non-conditional 
primary meanings – such as (7) and (8) repeated below – fulfil the criteria for conditionality.  
  
(7) If you’re thirsty, there’s some beer in the fridge. 
(8) I went in with a bone of complaint, if you like. ICE-GB S1A-064 142 
 
Such cases have traditionally been discarded from semantic analyses of conditionals. 
However, as we argue, in such cases, the conditional form will pertain to a secondary 
meaning which provides part of the input to the primary, non-conditional, meaning. This will 
mean that the criteria for conditionality (to repeat, of supposition and remoteness) will be 
preserved at some level of interpretation.22 Let us start with the classic biscuit conditional (7). 
The existence of beer in the fridge is not contingent on the hearer’s thirst; instead, as in 
standard interpretations, p provides a felicity condition of relevance on asserting q. Indeed, 
the primary meaning is likely to be that of an offer, as in (7a). 
 
(7a) Please help yourself to some beer. 
 
Since the antecedent in (7) does not seem to contribute to the primary meaning of the 
utterance, the question is whether there it has any implicit conditional relation with the 
consequent. We maintain that there is. Under contextualist assumptions, the illocutionary 
goal can be made explicit by enriching the consequent to highlight the intended conditional 
relationship between p and q; if we enrich the consequent of (7), the conditional meaning can 
be made overt, as in (7b).23 
 
                                                          
22 Geis & Lycan (1993) provide examples to show that ‘non-conditional conditionals’ lie on a continuum with 
respect to the extent that they adhere to syntactic and (minimalist) semantic criteria for conditionality stemming 
from the sentence form. By taking on board pragmatic criteria, we are able to include the full spectrum of 
conditional sentences in the overarching category of conditionals on the basis that while such ‘non-conditional 
conditionals’ do not always express conditional thoughts as primary, they nevertheless express conditional 
secondary meanings. We thank an anonymous reviewer for directing us to this reference. 
23 It must be noted that we are not making claims about the psychology of processing of indirect conditionals, 
and are not proposing that (7b) is a step in the inference from (7) to (7a), but merely that we can re-evaluate (7) 
as a direct conditional in the form of (7b) and that (7b) is one of the plausible secondary messages conveyed in 
uttering (7). 
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(7b) There is beer in the fridge which you may have if you want some. 
 
It is now clear that (7) fulfils the criteria for conditionality: the speech act expressed by the 
consequent is restricted to the eventuality expressed in the antecedent, which is only 
supposed and as such remote. But, to repeat, this conditional meaning remains only 
secondary to (7a). 
 Now, hedges in conditional sentences can be used in two ways. Sentence (13) 
exemplifies a conventionalised way of hedging an assertion, indicating that the speaker is not 
completely committed to the truth of q.  
 
(13) If I remember rightly you had jaundice, didn’t you? ICE-GB S1A-028 051 
 
Given that p is used to hedge q, it is perhaps not too surprising that p fulfils the criteria for 
conditionality: q is only asserted on the assumption that p is true, but p in its role as a hedging 
device makes it clear that the speaker is not committed to the truth of p. This way of hedging, 
i.e. hedging of the propositional content, is in contrast to that of metalinguistic conditionals, 
where the antecedent comments not on the content of the consequent, but on the 
appropriateness of the linguistic form of the consequent as in (14). 
  
(14) Very short skirt on if you don’t mind me saying. ICE-GB S1A-040 089 
 
In (14), the ‘if’-clause is used to hedge the illocutionary force, and in particular the 
appropriateness or felicity of making the utterance. Unlike ‘if I remember’ cases, the speaker 
cannot retract the assertion as it is already ‘out there’, and if the hearer rejects the antecedent, 
for example by asking (14a), the speaker is only able to retract the acceptability of the 
assertion, not the assertion itself. 
 
(14a) What if I do mind?  
 
Rather than to hedge the speaker’s belief in q, p softens the force of the assertion made by q 
by both invoking the hearer’s agreement or opinion (remoteness), as well as supplying a 
condition on which the expression is felicitously used (supposition). An analogous structure 
is that of the metalinguistic phrase ‘if you like’, given in (8). 
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(8) I went in with a bone of complaint, if you like. ICE-GB S1A-064 142 
 
As with other metalinguistic comments, ‘if you like’ comments on the appropriateness of the 
words uttered, not on the propositional content of the consequent: by hedging the non-
propositional content via a conditional form, the hearer is provided with an opportunity not to 
accept the assertion into the discourse. This is in contrast to non-conditional metalinguistic 
phrases such as ‘so to speak’ and ‘as it were’ which also hedge the illocutionary force but do 
not allow the hearer an opening to reject the appropriateness of the words uttered.24 
 Finally, it is worth pointing out that there are cases where an ‘if’-clause has no uttered 
consequent, as these cases illustrate an extreme case of appealing to speakers’ intentions in 
recovering the conditional meaning, as in (15). 
 
(15) Now if you’d like to put on your helmet. ICE-GB S2A-054 063 
 
In (15) there is no uttered consequent to indicate the speech-act type, yet via the 
conventionalised opening ‘if you’, the hearer understands the primary meaning to be (15a). 
 
(15a) Please put on your helmet. 
 
If any consequent could be recovered, (e.g. ‘…that’d be great’ or ‘…you’ll be safer’), it 
would provide the rationale for the hearer taking the action p. In such cases we acknowledge 
that there may not be one single intended consequent which is recoverable from the context, 
or that, at the level of thoughts, there may not even be an intended consequent. Irrespective of 
the content of q, a standalone ‘if’-clause can still fulfil the requirements for expressing a 
conditional secondary meaning as a result of the structure itself: whatever q may be, the ‘if’-
clause is responsible for implicating some positive (conditional) consequence, which in turn 
induces the hearer to take the action specified in p.  
 To wrap up, we have detailed here some of the ways in which conditional sentences 
may be used. We include all these types in our object of study not only because they pertain 
to different degrees of intentions associated with conditional meaning, but also because, on 
our construal, recoverability of the conditional relationship is independent of whether the 
conditional meaning is the primary meaning of the utterance.  
                                                          
24 See Elder (2015) for a defence of including utterances using ‘if you like’ in the category of conditionals. 
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3.3. Non-conditional sentences with conditional meaning 
 
3.3.1. Non-conditional sentences with conditional primary meaning 
 
We now move to providing some examples that fit in the class of non-conditional sentences 
expressing conditional thoughts, explaining the conditions under which they would fulfil the 
pragmatic criteria for conditionality.25 Given our pragmatic criteria, there is no obvious 
restriction on the types of non-conditional sentences that express conditional thoughts. 
Nevertheless, we can fit such expressions into two broad categories. First, there is the 
intermediate class of lexical items that yield so-called “sentences of implied condition” 
(Humberstone 2011: 948), such as ‘unless’, ‘provided’, ‘in case’, and so forth, as in examples 
(16)-(19) below. Similarly, ‘when’ (20), ‘given that’ (21), ‘supposing’ (22), ‘assuming’ (23) 
and their imperative or exhortative versions (24)-(25) may also express conditional thoughts.  
 
(16) You’re very unlikely to get someone to commission you to write something unless 
you’ve already written and published quite a lot. ICE- GB S1A-066 117 
(17) The quickest way into the West End from there is Gospel Oak, provided you know the 
times of the trains. ICE- GB S1A-023 210 
(18) In case you have any problems, your enumerator has been trained to help.  
 ICE- GB S2B-044 068 
(19) In case you’re wondering, that’s not to the loo. ICE- GB S1A-010 057 
(20) When you follow that through you’ve got the means to give rise to a change in the 
method. ICE- GB S2A-037 122 
(21) Given that linguistics is not democratic, we can’t necessarily accept that.  
 ICE- GB S1B-002 215 
(22) Supposing she’d said that to a psychiatrist, what would they say? ICE- GB S1A-031 128 
(23) That is correct assuming his face was pointing forwards. ICE- GB S1B-068 090 
(24) Suppose you hadn’t been able to raise finance at all. ICE- GB S1B-061 001 
(25) Let’s assume that was a noun phrase. ICE- GB S1B-002 131 
 
                                                          
25 Recall it is not our purpose here to create a database of sentence types that may express conditional meanings, 
but rather to put forward the criteria that will delimit the pragmatic category of conditionality. 
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These examples bear different degrees of resemblance to the form of ‘if-then’ sentences, with 
some appearing obviously conditional by the subordinate-main clause structure, while the 
exhortative and imperative versions of ‘suppose’ and ‘assume’ in (24) and (25) form 
syntactically independent clauses, requiring two independent sentences to make up the 
conditional thought. Each of these lexical items intuitively expresses a condition in the same 
way as the antecedents of standard conditional sentences that use ‘if’. But more importantly, 
what all of these examples have in common is that the two criteria for conditionality are 
satisfied.  
 While each of these examples contains a particular lexical item that can invoke a 
conditional sense, it goes without saying that the conditional meaning only arises when the 
pragmatic criteria are fulfilled by appealing to extra-linguistic information regarding the 
relation between eventualities described and the speaker’s epistemic stance towards the 
antecedent. That is, for each lexical item listed, there are other non-conditional uses of that 
word. We will not detail them all here but, for example, it is only conjunctive ‘when’ that 
may introduce a conditional which is in contrast to ‘when’ signalling factuality, as in (26). 
 
(26) Of course everybody thought he was quite mad but when he lifted a huge block of 
stone and lifted it above his head then they realised that he was inspired by a great 
force. ICE-GB S2B-027 071 
 
Similarly, ‘in case’ does not always express a condition; it may only be classed as conditional 
when ‘in case’ can be substituted for ‘if it is the case that’ as in (18), as the antecedent 
specifies the situation where the consequent may occur, or when ‘in case’ provides a felicity 
condition for the consequent as in (19), drawing a parallel with biscuit conditionals detailed 
in the previous section. However, ‘in case’ in its precautionary use, such as (27), does not 
restrict the situations where the main clause holds. Instead, ‘in case’ provides there the 
justification for the action described in the main clause, and so does not fall into the class of 
conditionals. 
 
(27) I will take an umbrella in case it rains. 
 
 The second option is to find particular sentence structures that can express conditional 
meanings, but which are not of the standard ‘if-then’ form. A well-known example is that of 
‘conditional conjunction’ as in (1), repeated below. 
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(1) Touch her iPad and she’ll scream. 
 
Klinedinst & Rothschild (2012) propose that ‘and’ is lexically ambiguous between the truth-
tabular conjunctive use and its conditional use, where in a conditional use of ‘and’ there is a 
(possibly unpronounced) necessity modal present in the second conjunct which gives rise to 
the conditional reading. We agree that such uses of ‘and’ do give rise to conditional readings, 
but in the same way as we do not restrict conditionality to ‘if’, we prefer not to put the onus 
on the lexical item ‘and’. Rather, they can be identified by applying the conditionality 
criteria. The criterion of supposition is easy to identify: it is only when the eventuality 
described in p obtains that the eventuality in q can obtain. With regard to the second criterion 
(the criterion of remoteness), one could argue that it is the hypothetical status of the 
imperative of p that indicates that p is not being put forward as a statement of truth. But note 
that while an imperative in p typifies these conditional conjunctions, we still have to appeal to 
speakers’ intentions to recognise the remoteness element.26 Equally it is clearly not the 
conjunction ‘and’ that is responsible for the conditional reading either, as we can also obtain 
conditional readings of so-called ‘enthymematic conditionals’ (cf. Horn 2013) such as (29) 
and (30) where the conditional relation is not specified by any specific lexical item but the 
conditional sense must be extrapolated through pragmatic inference.  
 
(28) You call the cops, I break her legs.  
(29) No pain, no gain. 
(30) You like it? It’s yours. 
 
We maintain that these examples essentially work in the same way, but to exemplify the case 
of (30), the remoteness criterion is borne out of the polar question that gives rise to 
alternatives, while q is conditional on the assumption of the affirmative.  
 Needless to say, there are many other ways in which conditional thoughts may be 
externalised by different syntactic forms. For example, relative or infinitival clauses may 
signal conditionality (see Wen-Li 1983 for a longer list). However, since such grammatical 
forms can also express non-conditional thoughts, and, moreover, conditionality is not limited 
                                                          
26 It is for this reason that an utterance of ‘I will touch her iPad and she will scream’ is unlikely to receive the 
conditional interpretation: p is put forward as a statement of intention, and so no remoteness is associated with 
it. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out such cases to us. 
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to particular structures, it is futile to attempt a full list. To repeat, once we classify 
conditionals using pragmatic as opposed to lexical or grammatical criteria, there is no 
restriction on the types of sentence form in which conditionality may arise.  
 
3.3.2. Non-conditional sentences with conditional secondary meaning 
 
So far we have focussed on cases where the uttered sentence provides some condition p for a 
(overtly or covertly expressed) consequent q. But when we adopt conditional thought as the 
object of analysis, then not only can we include conditional thoughts that are expressed as 
primary meaning through non-conditional sentences (Section 3.3.1) but also, arguably, cases 
where conditional thought is conveyed but does not pertain to the main intended content. This 
final class we tentatively propose is included principally for the sake of completeness as a 
logically possible, and at the same time empirically attestable, option. This is the category of 
non-conditional sentences with conditional thoughts as their secondary meanings. This 
category is of a lesser interest in the analysis of discourse (at the same time, possibly of a 
greater interest to a psycholinguist or a philosopher of action) but ought to be included in that 
assumptions pertaining to such hypothetical thoughts can be present in our reasoning patterns 
even when they are not expressed either in the sentence structure or as primary meaning.  
 For example, the conditional conjunction (1) repeated below can be enriched to reveal 
the associated conditional meaning as in (1a) and hence it was discussed in Section 3.3.1. 
However, arguably, the primary intended meaning can also be that of (1b), advising the 
hearer not to move. 
 
(1) Touch her iPad and she’ll scream. 
(1a) If you touch her iPad, she’ll scream. 
(1b) Don’t touch her iPad. 
 
In this case, the non-conditional expression has the conditional thought (1a) as a secondary 
meaning.  
 We can go further. Once we look at non-conditional primary meanings of conditional 
sentences, we can work backwards to suggest that if it were the case that the primary 
meaning had been uttered, the conditional thought would nevertheless have been present; it is 
this conditional thought that provides the rationale for the assertion of that primary meaning. 
Example (15) and its primary meaning (15a) are repeated below. 
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(15) Now if you’d like to put on your helmet. ICE-GB S2A-054 063 
(15a) Please put on your helmet. 
 
Let us assume that (15a) was the uttered material. It has the primary meaning that the hearer 
should put on his/her helmet. However, implicit in such an utterance will be, in some contexts 
and for some addressees, the associated context-dependent conditional thought of (15b). 
 
(15b) If you put on your helmet, you’ll be safer. 
 
To emphasise our disclaimer at this point, we do not endeavour to assess the cognitive reality 
of such a category of conditionals: conditional secondary meanings such as (15b) will be 
activated in some contexts but not in others, and for some addressees but not for others. We 
merely conjecture that when we go this far into pragmatic inference, hypothetical thought is 
present in our everyday reasoning patterns and thus has a place in a full spectrum of 
conditional thoughts. But not including the category of non-conditional utterances with 
secondary conditional meanings would have no repercussions on the remainder of the 
proposal. 
 
4. Conditionals in Default Semantics 
 
Following our aim to provide a uniform representation of the meaning of utterances 
expressing a conditional thought, we now turn to the merits of contextualist accounts, and in 
particular the account on which semantics acquires a very broad understanding, namely 
Default Semantics. Contextualism comes in many different strengths and flavours (see e.g. 
Recanati 2012; Jaszczolt 2012, 2015 for up-to-date introductions) but the general 
assumptions uniting this group of approaches are that (i) semantics and pragmatics both 
contribute to truth-conditional content; and (ii) context-sensitivity is not reduced to a basic set 
of expressions (indexicals) but is rather unpredictable: in different contexts, different 
expressions may require contextual modification. This view is to be contrasted with so-called 
semantic minimalism (Borg 2004, 2012; Cappelen and Lepore 2005) according to which 
there is only a very limited set of expressions that require contextual resolution.  
 Some contextualists claim that all pragmatic effects that contribute to truth-
conditional content have to be attributable to context-sensitive elements in the logical form of 
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the sentence. This variant is called indexicalism (e.g. Stanley 2000). A more radical variant 
claims that pragmatic contribution to truth-conditional content can be not only ‘bottom-up’ as 
Recanati (2010) calls it, but also ‘top-down’, not requiring a ‘go-ahead’ from a respective slot 
in the logical form. The next question that these variants of contextualism have to address is 
where to place the cut-off point for this contextual resolution of meaning. For some theorists, 
the logical form of the uttered sentence can be developed freely (‘top-down’) until it reaches 
the stage at which it represents the meaning intended by the speaker and/or recovered by the 
addressee. Here relevance theorists (see e.g. Carston 2002) and truth-conditional 
pragmaticists (see e.g. Recanati 2010) vary in their adopted perspectives but this issue is 
tangential to our current concern. In the most radical version, and the one that we subscribe 
to, the logical form of the uttered sentence can not only be modified, but on some occasions 
can also be overridden. In the terminology of Speech Act Theory, this is the case when the 
message is communicated indirectly and the indirect speech act is the main intended 
meaning.  
 We subscribe to the view that there is nothing to stop a radical contextualist from 
adopting this indirect but primary, main message as the object of a truth-conditional 
representation. In fact, this strategy seems the most satisfactory one in that it allows us to 
formally represent the main meaning intended by the speaker and recovered by the addressee. 
This line of argument is pursued in Default Semantics (Jaszczolt, e.g. 2005, 2010, 2016) 
which aims at modelling the primary meaning intended by the Model Speaker (‘model’ in 
that the procedures have to be generalisable) and recovered by the Model Addressee (‘and’ in 
that it aims at general heuristics and as such is not concerned with communication 
breakdown, leaving that problem to psycholinguistic research). Such primary meanings are 
then represented in truth-conditional merger representations that we use below to represent 
the meanings of overt and covert conditionals.27  
                                                          
27 A question arises at this point as to whether such a radically contextualist approach to truth-conditional 
content still falls in the domain of semantics or is better situated in pragmatics. Recanati (2012: 148) tries to 
salvage grammar-controlled semantics while advocating contextualist truth-conditional content: 
“Is semantic interpretation a matter of holistic guesswork (like the interpretation of kicks under the 
table), rather than an algorithmic, grammar-driven process as formal semanticists have claimed? 
Contextualism: Yes. Literalism: No. (…) Like Stanley and the formal semanticists, I maintain that the 
semantic interpretation is grammar-driven.”  
This stance relies on the assumption that the truth-conditional content corresponding to the main intended 
speech act cannot be algorithmically computed. However, merger representations of Default Semantics utilised 
here demonstrate that linguists may not be far away from such an algorithmic treatment of the contextualist 
content.   
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 It should be immediately obvious that a radical contextualist account of this kind is a 
particularly appropriate framework for handling the broad class of conditionals we opted for 
in the previous sections. We will be able to represent conditional sentences that exhibit 
different kinds of relations between the antecedent and the consequent, including ‘biscuit’ 
conditionals and other non-standard conditionals, in that information that contributes to the 
truth-conditional content can come from a variety of sources that can be jointly called 
‘pragmatic’ insofar that they are external to the structure and the lexicon. We will also be 
able to represent the conditional meaning of sentences whose form is not conditional in that 
the primary meaning that is represented in the merger representation need not resemble the 
logical form of the uttered sentence. To repeat, in the case of indirect communication, the 
logical form of the sentence can be overridden and the merger representation of the indirect 
(but primary) meaning can be constructed relying on various extralinguistic sources of 
information. All in all, the diversity of ways of expressing conditional meaning, as well as the 
diversity of uses to which conditional ‘if’ can be put, are not a problem for a radical 
contextualist theory. In short, we propose to view the conditional as a semantic and cognitive 
universal that is operative in human thought and is present in the semantic representation of 
natural language sentences as they are used in communication.  
 Default Semantics (henceforth DS) is a compositional approach to natural language 
meaning but it assumes that compositionality is to be predicated not of the natural language 
sentences like a minimalist semantic account would, but rather of the level at which 
information coming from different sources in conversation interacts. We can call this an 
assumption of interactive compositionality. The general idea of interactive, or ‘Gestaltist’ 
compositionality is adapted from Recanati (2004: 132): 
 
 The meaning of the whole is influenced by top-down, pragmatic factors, and through 
the meaning of the whole the meanings of the parts are also affected. So we need a 
more ‘interactionist’ or even ‘Gestaltist’ approach to compositionality. 
 
But DS goes further in that it accommodates indirect primary meanings:  merger 
representations are compositional structures (in the sense of ‘interactive compositionality’) 
but, to repeat, they are not always built out of the logical forms of the uttered sentences. In 
this respect, it departs from the original Fregean compositionality used in standard 
Montagovian formal semantics. As such, compositionality has here the status of a 
methodological assumption and comes part-way towards the cognitive-semantic idea that 
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compositionality of language strongly relies on the compositionality of thought as developed 
for example in Embodied Construction Grammar (see e.g. Feldman 2010). Unlike 
cognitivists, however, we adhere to truth conditions as our explanatory tool and, so to speak, 
‘kick’ the truth-conditional analysis higher up to the level of primary intended meanings.28 
 The sources of meaning identified in DS are presented diagrammatically in Fig. 1 
(adapted from Jaszczolt 2010: 198). For readers who are not familiar with the framework, the 
description of the sources can either be regarded as tangential to our main concern, or 
alternatively the reader is referred to a range of publications on DS (especially Jaszczolt 
2005, 2010, 2016 for a comprehensive account). Σ is a symbol used for merger representation 
and it stands for the summation of information coming from the identified sources. 
  
                                                          
28 At this point we include the disclaimer that we do not aim to provide an account of how the sources of 
information interact to generate the primary meaning, but acknowledge that they interact in line with the 
methodological assumption of interactive compositionality. 
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world knowledge (WK) 
      word meaning and sentence structure (WS) 
 
 
                         
                       
 
        situation of discourse (SD) 
       
stereotypes and presumptions  properties of human inferential system (IS) 
about society and culture (SC) 
 
 
Fig. 1: Sources of information contributing to a merger representation Σ 
 
 
 
 
merger representation Σ 
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The source WS pertains to the logical form of the sentence. Contextualist theories that retain 
the logical form as the semantic baseline prioritise WS, allowing some or all of the remainder 
of the sources of information, which can be jointly termed ‘context of utterance’, to (i) enrich 
the logical form to produce an adequately intuitive truth-conditional unit and to (ii) produce 
implicatures. In DS, WS plays a slightly different role. First, as in all semantic theories, it 
serves as the input to a pragmatic process of recovering the primary meaning. The difference 
is that when looking at truth conditions of primary meanings, WS no longer has such a 
privileged role in meaning recovery. Instead, to repeat, WS contributes to the merger 
representation on an equal footing with the other sources, and in different contexts may or 
may not take precedence in informing the proposition corresponding to that primary meaning. 
 Next, DS identifies a range of processes that operate on the sources of information 
identified in Fig. 1, which in turn contribute to the formation of a merger representation. 
These processes are given diagrammatically in Fig. 2.29  
  
                                                          
29 For readers more interested in the details of the approach, it may be pointed out that one can identify a 
mapping, albeit not a bi-unique one, between the sources and the processes: 
WK    SCWD or CPI 
 SC    SCWD or CPI 
 WS    WS (logical form) 
 SD    CPI 
 IS    CD 
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Fig. 2: Utterance interpretation according to the processing model of DS 
 
merger representation Σ 
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DS makes use of this processing model and in the representations of conditionals below we 
index the components of each Σ with a subscript standing for the type of processing.  
 We are now in a position to construct merger representations for conditionals. To 
exemplify, conditional perfection from ‘if’ to ‘iff’ (Geis and Zwicky 1971; see also Horn 
2000) in the seminal sentence (31) would be represented in DS as in Fig. 3.  
 
(31) If you mow the lawn, I will give you five dollars. 
 
The language of the representations is an adapted and extended version of that used in 
Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp and Reyle 1993): x, y, z, Σ' and Σ'' used in Fig. 3 
stand for discourse referents, the formulae below them are discourse conditions, the square 
brackets encase the material on which a given DS-process operates, and the type of the 
process is indicated in the subscript (see Fig. 2). ACC stands for the modal operator of 
acceptability with which temporality of events is represented, the subscript ∆ for the degree 
of epistemic commitment to the truth of the eventuality, and the superscripts ‘tf’ and ‘rf’ for 
tenseless future and regular future respectively.30 
                                                          
30 The representation of the temporal reference is included in the Σs for the sake of completeness but it is not 
relevant for the present considerations. The theory of temporality as modality has been developed in Jaszczolt 
(2009) and interested readers are referred there for a detailed account.  
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Fig. 3. Σ for the ‘perfected’ reading of ‘If you mow the lawn, I will give you five dollars.’   
x y z Σ' Σ'' 
  
[the speaker]WS,CPI (x) 
[the addressee]WS,CPI (y)  
[the lawn]WS (z) 
[Σ' → Σ'']WS 
[ACC∆tf ⊦Σ'] WS 
[ACC∆rf ⊦Σ''] WS,CD 
Σ' [y mow z]WS 
Σ'' [x give $5 to y]WS 
 [Σ' ↔ Σ'']CPI 
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In the case of Fig. 3, the content of the two eventualities represented as Σ' and  Σ'' comes 
directly from the source WS31, while the primary meaning of the bi-conditional is attributed 
to the process of CPI (conscious pragmatic inference).32 
 We now move to representing a wider range of expressions that fall into our class of 
conditionals, pragmatically defined as expressions that are used for representing conditional 
thought. We consider six different types of examples: (C1) is the typical case: a standard, 
overt conditional with a strong, primary conditional meaning; (C2) is a conditional sentence 
with a primary meaning that is not conditional; (C3) is an example of a sentence that does not 
have a conditional form but whose primary meaning is conditional; (C4) is again an example 
of a sentence that does not have a conditional form but whose primary meaning is not 
conditional either; instead, it has a secondary conditional meaning; (C5) is an instance of an 
incomplete conditional sentence where the conditional meaning is primary; and finally (C6) 
is an instance of an incomplete conditional sentence where the conditional meaning is 
secondary. To repeat, (C4) could have easily been excluded from this analysis but since it is 
possible for conditional thought to be communicated as secondary meaning, we decided to 
include it for the sake of completeness.  
We use two dimensions for identifying these six categories. The first dimension 
pertains to the source of information that is responsible for generating the conditional 
meaning. There are conditional meanings that arise out of the structure of the sentence alone 
(WS), as in (C1) and (C2), and conditional meanings whose computation requires merger 
representations (Σ) as in (C3)-(C6), where (C4) corresponds to the tentatively included 
category of secondary conditional meanings, and (C5)-(C6) represent incomplete sentences 
where the consequent is missing and has to be recovered. The second dimension pertains to 
the status of conditional meaning as primary or secondary. The conditional meanings can be 
main, primary meanings of the utterances (PM) as in (C1), (C3) and (C5), or additional, 
secondary meanings (SM) as in (C2), (C4) and (C6). These two dimensions are indicated for 
each of the types listed by the relevant subscripts. 
 
 
(C1)  (p → q)WS, PM 
                                                          
31 These are allocated to WS with the proviso that the contextual resolution of the indexicals has to take place. 
32 As noted by von Fintel (2001) and discussed in Elder (2014), the example ‘If you mow the lawn I will give 
you five dollars’ would not always give rise to a perfected reading. 
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 ‘If it rains, we will stay at home.’ 
 =PM 
 
(C2)  (p → q)WS, SM 
 ‘If you are hungry, there is food in the fridge.’  
 =SM  
 (PM: ‘Help yourself to food from the fridge.’) 
 
(C3) ( p → q)Σ, PM 
 ‘Touch his iPad and he will scream.’  
 PM: ‘If you touch his iPad, he will scream.’ 
 
?(C4) (p → q)Σ, SM  
 ‘Please put on your helmet.’  
 SM: ‘If you put on your helmet, you will be safer.’  
 (PM: ‘Please put on your helmet.’) 
 
(C5)  (p → ?)Σ, PM 
 ‘If you leave the tea on a wobbly table…’ 
 PM: e.g. ‘If you leave the tea on a wobbly table, you will spill it.’33 
 
(C6)  (p → ?)Σ, SM  
 ‘If you’d like to put on your helmet.’  
 SM: e.g. ‘If you put on your helmet you will be safer.’ 
 (PM: ‘Please put on your helmet.’) 
 
 
Let us consider an example of ‘Σ + PM’, that is (C5). The merger representation for (C5) can 
now be constructed as in Fig. 4. 
  
                                                          
33 It is also possible for this sentence to have the primary meaning to the effect ‘Don’t leave your tea on the 
wobbly table’, depending on the scenario. Mutatis mutandis for (C4). 
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Fig. 4. Σ for (C5): p → ?PM ‘If you leave the tea on a wobbly table…’ 
x y z Σ' Σ'' 
  
 [the addressee]WS,CPI (x)  
[tea]WS (y) 
[wobbly table]WS (z) 
[Σ' → Σ'']CD,CPI 
[ACC∆tf ⊦Σ'] WS 
[ACC∆rf ⊦Σ'']CD,CPI 
Σ' [x leave y on  z]WS 
Σ'' [x spill y]CD,CPI 
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In this case, the conditional primary meaning is constructed from the merger of information 
that requires input from the context of utterance. Specifically, the content of the antecedent 
comes directly from WS, but the content of the consequent has to be recovered via a 
cognitive default (CD) with conscious pragmatic inference (CPI). Note that this example also 
uses the modal operator of acceptability (ACC) to represent the futurity of the events. 
 Next, Fig. 5 represents the primary, non-conditional meaning of (C6).  
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Fig. 5. Σ for the PM of (C6): p → ?SM ‘If you’d like to put on your helmet.’ (PM: ‘Please put 
on your helmet.’) 
x  y  Σ'  Σ'' 
  
[the addressee]WS,CPI (x)  
[x’s helmet]WS (y) 
Σ' [the speaker requests Σ'' ]CD,CPI 
Σ'' [x put on y]WS 
  
 
 
  
 
37 
 
Here, the speaker’s request is borne out of a cognitive default (CD) coupled with conscious 
pragmatic inference (CPI), while the content of the request Σ'' is attributed to WS. The 
secondary, conditional meaning would be represented in a standard way. 
 Finally, Fig. 6 represents the primary conditional meaning of the non-conditional 
sentence (C3). 
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Fig. 6. Σ for the PM of (C3): p → q Σ, PM ‘Touch his iPad and he will scream.’ (PM: ‘If you 
touch his iPad, he will scream.’) 
x  y  z  Σ'  Σ'' 
  
 [the addressee]WS,CPI (x)  
[z’s ipad]WS (y) 
[contextually salient male]WS,CPI (z) 
[Σ' → Σ'']CD,CPI 
[ACC∆tf ⊦Σ']CD,CPI 
[ACC∆rf ⊦Σ'']WS 
Σ' [x touch y]WS,CD,CPI 
Σ'' [z scream ]WS 
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As in the case of (C5), the conditional primary meaning is borne out of the merger of 
information via the processes CD and CPI, but in this case, WS contributes both to the 
antecedent and the consequent. Other identified types are represented in an analogous way.  
 Finally, in Section 3 we also identified various categories of conditionals depending 
on the semantic properties of the link between the antecedent and the consequent, for 
example sentences in which the antecedent is used to hedge the propositional content, as in 
(13), or to hedge the illocutionary force, as in (14), both repeated below. 
 
(13) If I remember rightly you had jaundice, didn’t you? ICE-GB S1A-028 051 
(14) Very short skirt on if you don’t mind me saying. ICE-GB S1A-040 089 
 
The next step will be to test DS as regards its ability to represent the semantic (in the sense of 
the contextualist semantics adopted here) properties of this link. In some cases, the task will 
be to represent the primary meaning that is not itself conditional but instead, for example, 
pertains to a speech act of reproaching or reprimanding; in others the primary meaning will 
pertain to a conditional structure but the representation of the antecedent will have to reflect 
its hedging role. But this is a task for a separate project. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
We hope to have provided compelling arguments in favour of a pragmatic category of 
conditionals that encompasses our categories (C1)-(C6) and yields itself a uniform truth-
conditional contextualist analysis in terms of merger representations of DS. Only when the 
object of study is conceived broadly and includes various ways of externalising conditional 
thought can we be hopeful of arriving at a comprehensive, explanatorily successful account. 
We have demonstrated here that adopting a version of the radical contextualist approach to 
meaning allows one to formally represent conditionality, conceived here as a universal 
conceptual category. This radical contextualist outlook comes with a rethinking of the 
principle of compositionality of meaning and reallocating it to an interaction of information 
about meaning that comes from different aspects of the situation of discourse. In this way we 
are able to go beyond the syntactic category of conditionals to talk about a conceptual 
representation of conditionality, which allows us to propose what we call a ‘pragmatic 
category of conditionals’: ‘pragmatic’ in the sense that pragmatics plays a core role in 
arriving at the truth-conditional representation. We have demonstrated how this composition 
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works in merger representations of DS for different ways of expressing conditional thought in 
natural language. In short, we hope to have provided arguments for a uniform treatment of 
expressing conditional thoughts in discourse, irrespective of whether they are expressed 
overtly or covertly in communication and irrespective of their primary or secondary status.  
 Representing conditional meanings of utterances in preference to conditional 
structures alone comes with some negative consequences in that although the phenomenon 
appears unified, cognitively plausible and justified to a pragmaticist, it may not appear so to 
linguists who prefer to divide the subject matter by grammatical structures. But the 
advantages outweigh the shortcomings in that we are investigating the conceptual category 
that, as we discussed earlier, has a strong claim to the status of a semantic universal. In this 
way we are able to include constructions from languages in which conditionality does not 
correspond to a syntactic category but instead is realised as an irrealis marker or a polar 
question. And, as this paper has demonstrated, there are also significant advantages for the 
analysis of languages that do have a designated conditional structure but in addition use a 
variety of different means to convey conditional meaning in discourse. Moreover, since 
formal analyses have demonstrated that the conditional is not a syntactic category in its own 
right but instead ‘if’-clauses are adverbial clauses and “[t]he history of the conditional is the 
story of a syntactic mistake” (Kratzer 1991/2012: 106), it is prudent to take this finding 
further into the pragmatic and cognitive domain and investigate whether the cognitive 
counterpart of this claim would not simply be a conceptual category of supposition that one 
has to accept before assessing the proposition dependent on it. And this conceptual link, as 
we have seen in the pragmatic categories we propose, is best approached from the pragmatic 
perspective, taking the discourse realisation of the conditional thought as the object to be 
represented. In short, conditional thoughts seem to give rise to a clearly delineable, pragmatic 
phenomenon that yields to a uniform contextualist analysis.  
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